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1. INTRODUCTION
The Internet offers the possibility of global data sharing and collaboration. To that end,
one commonly used class of mechanisms is data shared via file sharing, in the form of
distributed/networked filesystems. However, most existing systems do not offer secure,
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Fig. 1. File sharing across distinct administrative domains. Each administrative domain keeps track of its users
in a user account database. Alice cannot grant Bob access to files on file server A because Bob is not listed in
domain A’s user database.
scalable and dynamic cooperation across organizational boundaries. When users in dis-
tinct administrative domains try to share files, they are faced with either inefficient and
cumbersome exchange of information or compromises in security.
For example, consider users Alice and Bob, employees of two different companies, who
wish to collaborate on a project (see Figure 1). Alice and Bob have at least four approaches
with which to share project files:
(1) ask their system administrators to create accounts in their own administrative domain
for each remote user. This has several problems. First, it imposes an additional admin-
istrative burden, which is not scalable as we increase the number of users and projects.
Often the latency of opening an account for a new user is unacceptable. Second, cre-
ating an account for an external user raises escalation of privilege issues. Ideally the
user should only be able to use the account for the intended purpose, i.e., working on
the project files. However, an account could enable an external user to snoop, search
for local system vulnerabilities, use up CPU cycles, disk space etc. Because of these
problems, company policy typically limits or prohibits the creation of accounts for
external users.
(2) share account passwords. This approach has serious security implications as it causes
lack of accountability and enables escalation of privileges.
(3) avoid employing an access control mechanism and put the files on the web or anony-
mous ftp. This is an unacceptable solution if the content of the files is even remotely
sensitive.
(4) e-mail the files back and forth. This is an inefficient way of working as it does not take
advantage of any of the safeguards and conveniences that a file system has to offer. In
the event that the e-mails are sent in the clear, there are obvious security concerns as
well.
While more approaches can be imagined, the four listed illustrate the problem of file
sharing across organizational boundaries. This survey examines how access control mech-
anisms of different networked file systems handle file sharing across distinct administrative
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, Month 20YY.
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File 1 File 2
User X read read, write
User Y read
Fig. 2. An Access Control Matrix
domains.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. We establish a framework for comparison
in Section 2. Section 3 presents a taxonomy of networked file systems in our framework.
We analyse the results in Section 4 and conclude with Section 5.
2. COMPARISON FRAMEWORK
We survey a number of networked file systems with the aim of determining their suitability
for file sharing across organizational boundaries. To classify the surveyed systems we use
the following properties to define a comparison framework:
(1) Authentication: determines and verifies the identity of a principal in the system,
i.e., providing an answer to the question: “Who is the user?” Traditional authentication
mechanisms rely on maintaining a centralized database of user identities, making it difficult
to authenticate users in a different administrative domain as depicted in Figure 1. Systems
aiming to provide decentralized access control cannot rely on local identification and must
employ a decentralized authentication mechanism, or rely on indirect authentication.
(2) Authorization: determines the access rights of a principal, i.e., it provides an an-
swer to the question: “Is user X allowed to access resource R?” The common way of per-
forming authorization is to lookup a principal’s rights in an access control matrix [Lamp-
son 1971], e.g., such as the one depicted in Figure 2. The access control matrix is usually
implemented either in the form of access control lists (ACLs) or capabilities.
ACLs correspond to columns of the access control matrix. An ACL is associated with
every resource, i.e., every object in the file system, and lists all users authorized to access
the object along with their access rights. The identity of a user must be known before access
rights can be looked up in the ACL. Thus, authorization depends on prior authentication,
i.e., systems that rely on ACLs for authorization must use a decentralized authentication
mechanism to work across administrative boundaries.
Capabilities [Dennis and Van Horn 1966; Levy 1984] correspond to rows of the access
control matrix. A capability is an unforgeable token that identifies one or more resources
and the access rights granted to the holder of the capability. A user that possesses a capa-
bility can access the resources listed in the capability with the specified rights. In contrast
to ACLs, capabilities do not require explicit authentication, because the possession of the
capability implicitly authenticates the user1. Capabilities can be transferred among users,
which makes them suitable for authorization across organizational boundaries. However,
_
To contrast ACLs and capabilities consider the real life analogy of controlling access to a building. A doorman
might grant a visitor access after checking that his name appears on a visitors list. This identity approach is
similar to using ACLs to control access to files. In contrast a tenant might gain access to the building by using
the key that was issued to him upon signing a lease. The key is similar to a capability that is not explicitly tied to
an identity. The key can be conveniently shared, however care must be taken that it does not fall into the wrong
hands.
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Fig. 3. Simplified structure of the UNIX file system (from [Farmer and Venema 2004]).
Fig. 4. On-disk layout of a typical UNIX file system (from [Farmer and Venema 2004]).
because possession of a capability conveys access rights, capabilities must be protected
from theft, which requires that they be transferred over secure and authenticated channels
[Tanenbaum et al. 1986].
(3) Granularity: is the extent to which a system contains discrete components of ever-
smaller size. E.g. UNIX file systems are organized within a single tree structure underneath
one root directory, internal nodes of the tree recursively represent sub-directories of the
root, and leaves of the tree can be either files or directories. At a lower layer of abstraction,
the same file system consists of inodes and data blocks (Figure 3), and yet another layer
lower one can find zones, labels, and partitions (Figure 4).
A network file system must strike a balance between too coarse-grained and too fine-
grained authorization. Some systems work at a coarser granularity of higher-level con-
tainer objects, e.g., directories or volumes. While coarser granularity decreases the amount
of access control meta-data and the number of access control decisions required, it can
make sharing of individual files cumbersome for users. In turn, systems that employ only
fine-granularity can become difficult to manage, e.g. having to specify block-level access
controls if only file-level control is desired can quickly become infeasible. Ideally, the
system should allow a frlexible level of access control granularity.
(4) Autonomous delegation: We evaluate the suitability of file systems for file sharing
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, Month 20YY.
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2nd Certificate
Admin −> Alice
Grant: RWX
Admin −> Alice
Grant: RWX
Alice −> Bob
Grant: R
ADMIN
ALICE
BOB
1st Certificate
Fig. 5. Delegation of privileges, from an administrator to Alice, and from Alice to Bob. The administrator grants
Alice full access by issuing her the first certificate. Alice can then delegate read access to Bob by issuing him the
second certificate. To be granted access Bob must present a certificate chain consisting of both certificates.
across organizational boundaries with minimal administrative overhead. A user should
be able to delegate access rights to another user. Figure 5 illustrates delegation using
authorization certificates. We identify the following requirements for delegation:
—Autonomy To facilitate ease of file sharing and lower administrative overhead, the del-
egation mechanism should be user-to-user, i.e., no administrator involvement should be
required.
—Accountability It should always be possible to determine who delegated access to a
particular user.
—Organizational independence A user should be able to delegate his access rights to
a user in a different administrative domain, if this is allowed by organizational policy.
Furthermore, this should be done while preserving accountability.
—Low Latency A user should be able to access a resource as soon after a delegation as
possible.
—Transitivity Delegation chaining should be possible, e.g., if Alice delegates access to
Bob, Bob should be able to further delegate to Carl (creating a chain from Alice to
Carl). A mechanism to restrict the right to further delegate and thus limit the length
of the delegation chain is also desirable. This allows the system to scale arbitrarily, by
pushing administrative responsibility to end users.
—Fine granularity A user should be able to delegate a subset of his access rights, e.g., if
Alice has read and write access to a file, she should be able to delegate read only access
to Bob.
(5) Revocation: While the ability to grant access to users in different administrative
domains is very desirable, a network file system should also have provisions for revoking
access. Revocation in systems that base authorization on ACLs is conceptually simpler: a
user’s access to an object can be revoked by editing the object’s ACL. Capability based sys-
tems have to rely on timeouts encoded in the capabilities or centralized revocation mech-
anisms, e.g., revocation lists or trusted on-line agents that determine if a capability is still
valid. An in-depth evaluation of revocation techniques for a capability based system is
presented in [Keromytis 2001].
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Fig. 6. NFS architecture (from [Sandberg et al. 1985])
We survey a number of networked file systems in this comparison framework in Section 3
and present the results in Table I and Table II.
3. NETWORKED FILE SYSTEMS
3.1 NFS
The Network File System (NFS) [Sandberg et al. 1985] developed at Sun Microsystems
remains one of the most widely used network-attached file systems. Security in NFS was
largely an afterthought, and global file sharing was not part of the original design. However
we choose to review NFS in our framework due to its familiarity and widespread use.
The NFS protocol uses the Sun Remote Procedure Call (RPC) [Lyon 1984] mechanism
as illustrated in Figure 6. The RPC protocol allows several styles of user authentication,
referred to as authentication flavors. The original NFS release used weak UNIX-style au-
thentication (user ID and group ID) where a user’s credentials can easily be forged (see
Figure 7). Even though support for Diffie-Hellman and Kerberos version 4 authentication
flavors was added later on, UNIX style authentication (AUTH SYS) was the only manda-
tory flavor and thus most commonly implemented. Host authentication is also weak, be-
cause it relies on easily spoofable IPs or DNS names.
Authorization in NFS follows UNIX semantics [Thompson 1978]. Thus, access to every
file is controlled by the standard UNIX mode bits associated with the file. The permission
bits can be viewed as a simple ACL, that lists three principals: the owner of the file, the
group associated with the file, and the group consisting of all other users2. The rights that
can be given to each principal are Read, Write and Execute. Before users can access a
remote file, the administrators on their workstation have to mount the file system where
the remote file is located. This is done through the mount protocol [Callaghan et al. 1995],
through which file system names are mapped to directory identifiers (handles). The remote
server’s administrator controls access to the desired file systems by listing exported file
systems and the hosts allowed to mount them in a file called /etc/exports. A handle for the
top-level directory of an exported file system will be provided to hosts that are allowed to
mount that file system. Once that handle is acquired, no further use of the mount protocol
`
Thus, we refer to UNIX mode bits as UNIX ACLs throughout the rest of the discussion.
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Fig. 7. NFS trust model when using the AUTH SYS authentication flavor (adopted from [Callaghan 2000]). The
NFS server trusts client hosts A and B. Access control is enforced by inspecting the source IP address of RPC
requests. User Bob can legitimately access his files after authenticating to client A. However, a superuser on
client B (root) can easily assume the credential of Bob without knowledge of his password. Finally, user Eve on
client C can spoof the IP address of client A. Thus, RPC requests from C look like they come from A. Now client
C is trusted even though it is not in the server’s access list.
is needed. This is another weakness of the NFS security model: since directory handles do
not change often (or at all), revocation of mount privileges cannot be assured.
While at first sight it seems that the object access granularity in NFS is at the file level,
the server actually trusts the client workstation that mounts an exported file system to check
file access rights3 (see Figures 7 and 8). Because no strong host authentication mechanism
is used, security is based merely on matching the IP or DNS name of the client workstation
with an entry in the exports list. Because a file cannot be shared without a file system being
exported on the server and mounted on the client, object-access granularity in NFS is at
the file system level.
Significant administrative involvement is required for Alice to share a file with Bob if
he resides in a different administrative domain. The administrator of Alice’s server must
trust Bob’s server and export a part of the local file system to it. The administrator of
Bob’s workstation must trust Alice’s server and mount the exported file system. Finally,
since access control is performed using UNIX permission bits, Bob must obtain an account
in Alice’s domain to have a meaningful UNIX user identifier (UID). Thus, autonomous
delegation between users in different administrative domains is not supported in NFS.
Revocation in NFS is conceptually simple. A server administrator can edit the export
list and remove directories or hosts. Administrators can also disable user accounts or edit
group definitions in the centrally administered user database. Finally, access to individual
files or directories can be revoked by changing the UNIX bit masks associated with them.
In summary, authentication and authorization in early versions of NFS were designed
assuming a tightly administered domain (e.g.,, a single campus LAN or extended LAN),
making it unsuitable for global file sharing. This view is reflected in some earlier litera-
ture. The creators of the Athena system [Rosenstein et al. 1988; Dyer 1988], which relies
on NFS and Kerberos, recognize some of the barriers to access control scalability. Accord-
a
This security problem was addressed with the introduction of the ACCESS procedure in NFSv3.
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Fig. 8. NFS access control granularity of the mount protocol. The server exports a file system (e.g. /home) to the
client. An administrator on the client mounts the exported file system (e.g. under /mnt). Because the server trusts
the client to enforce file access rights, object-access granularity in NFS is at the file system level.
ing to them, the numerous ACLs in the system were difficult to administer. In addition,
additional intermediate levels of access between administrators and users were desirable.
The authors of the Bones system [J. Scho¨nwa¨lder and H. Langendo¨rfer 1993] point out
similar problems.
3.2 NFSv4
NFS version 4 [Shepler et al. 2003] proposes many improvements over earlier versions.
Stronger security and better suitability to deployment on the Internet are among the design
requirements. A good overview of NFSv4 and a comparison with older versions is pre-
sented in [Pawlowski et al. 2000]. We review the relevant changes in the context of our
framework.
NFS is based on and relies on the underlying security of ONCRPC [Srinivasan 1995].
NFSv4mandates the use of strong RPC security flavors for authentication4. This is achieved
by adding a new security flavor based on the Generic Security Services API (GSS-API)
[Linn 1993a; Wray 1993] called RPCSEC GSS [Eisler et al. 1997]. RPCSEC GSS en-
capsulates the GSS-API messaging tokens and acts as a transport for conforming security
flavors. Currently the mechanisms implementing the GSS-API are Kerberos Version 5,
LIPKEY and SPKM:
—Kerberos version 5 [Kohl and Neuman 1993; Linn 1996] is a centralized authentication
system based on symmetric-key cryptography. Administrative domains in Kerberos are
called realms. An administrator maintains the user database for each realm. A Key Dis-
tribution Center (KDC) and Ticket Granting Service (TGS) grant users tickets that allow
them to access services on specific hosts in a realm. Because Kerberos relies on a trusted
third party and symmetric key cryptography, accessing services across administrative
boundaries is not straightforward. Administrators have to set up trust relationships and
exchange keys for users to access services in a different realm. While cross-realm au-
thentication has been studied [Trostle et al. 2001; Westerlund and Danielsson 2001],
e
Older methods (e.g., AUTH SYS) can optionally still be supported.
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Kerberos does not currently allow for autonomous delegation between users in differ-
ent administrative domains. A more extensive evaluation of Kerberos for decentralized
access control scenarios is presented in [Keromytis and Smith ].
—The Low Infrastructure Public Key (LIPKEY) [Eisler 2000] system provides an authen-
tication model resembling the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), that makes it more suitable
for use on the Internet. Authentication with LIPKEY is similar to using an HTTPS
server with htaccess, i.e., the server is authenticated with a public key certificate, while
the clients authenticate using usernames and passwords. Communication is encrypted
with a session key. This scheme relies on passwords being centrally managed at the
server, i.e. a user cannot delegate access to another user not listed in the centralized
password database without administrator involvement. Thus, LIPKEY is not suitable
for autonomous delegation between users in different administrative domains.
—In contrast to Kerberos, the Simple Public-Key GSS-API Mechanism (SPKM) [Adams
1996] is based on an asymmetric-key infrastructure. SPKM allows both unilateral and
mutual authentication to be accomplished without the use of secure timestamps. Thus,
out of the existing GSS-API mechanisms, SPKM with both client and server authen-
tication using public keys is most suitable for global file sharing across administrative
boundaries. However, the GSS-API decouples authentication and authorization, thus
limiting the support for autonomous delegation across administrative domains (see dis-
cussion in Subsection 3.12).
The implementation of user and group identifiers also influences the suitability of an
authentication mechanism for deployment across the Internet. Earlier NFS versions rep-
resented users and groups via 32 bit integers. This is unsuitable for global file sharing,
because user and group identifier assignments in different administrative domains are un-
likely to agree. NFSv4 uses character strings instead of integers to represent user and
group identifiers. Uniqueness can be guaranteed by using a format of user@domain or
group@domain and leveraging the global domain name registry.
Authorization in NFSv4 is enhanced over the UNIX mode bits used by earlier versions
with the introduction of support for ACL attributes. NFSv4 ACL support is based on
the Windows NT model [Microsoft Corporation 2005; Swift et al. 2002]. Access control
entries can be one of four types: ALLOW, DENY, AUDIT or ALARM. The ability to
explicitly grant access to users who are not the owner or in the group of a file improves
flexibility over standard UNIX ACLs. The ability to explicitly deny access facilitates rapid
revocation.
NFSv4 eliminates the mount protocol by using initialized file handles as in WebNFS
[Callaghan 1996a; 1996b]. File access rights as specified in ACLs are checked on the
server, not the client. Thus, while the server administrator still exports file systems rather
than individual files, object access granularity is at the file level.
While NFSv4 introduces changes that facilitate global file sharing (elimination of the
mount protocol, introduction of public file handles, a global user identifier name space), au-
tonomous delegation between users in different administrative domains is still not possible
with the currently supported authentication mechanisms. Kerberos requires administrator
involvement for establishing trust relationships between realms, while LIPKEY requires
administrator involvement in account creation for the non-local user.
Revocation mechanisms in NFSv4 remain mostly unchanged and involve editing ACLs.
Support for more feature-rich ACLs and negative rights in ACLs are the major changes
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, Month 20YY.
10 ]
over previous versions.
3.3 AFS
The Andrew file system (AFS) [Howard et al. 1988; Howard 1988; Satyanarayanan 1989;
1990; 1992] was developed at CMU as a secure distributed file system with centralized
user authentication. Scalability was a primary consideration in the design of AFS.
Authentication in AFS was initially based on a variant of the Needham-Schroeder au-
thentication protocol [Needham and Schroeder 1978]. The Kerberos authentication system
[Miller et al. 1987] was later adopted for purposes of standardization. In earlier versions of
AFS, users could only share files with other users in the same administrative domain. Later
versions of AFS introduced the notion of cells (also known as realms in Kerberos) defined
along administrative boundaries. Similarly to NFS with Kerberos support, this enables
users in different administrative domains to share files. However, cross-realm authentica-
tion requires administrator involvement, because a local administrator must configure in
advance which remote cells should be available to users in the local cell. Thus, AFS does
not support autonomous delegation between users in different administrative domains.
Authorization in AFS is based on Access Control Lists (ACLs). ACLs are associated
with directories rather than individual files. Thus, object access granularity is at the direc-
tory level. The authors argue that the reduction in state and conceptual simplicity coming
from a coarser granularity facilitate scalability. AFS ACLs specify the operations that
principals (users or groups) can perform on directories, namely:
—read any file in the directory
—write any file in the directory
—list directory contents
—insert new files in the directory
—delete files from the directory
—lock files in the directory
—administer the directory, i.e., modify the ACL
AFS ACLs can also specify negative rights, i.e., explicitly list operations that a principal
is not allowed to perform. In the case of conflicts, negative rights override positive rights.
This mechanism facilitates rapid and selective revocation, e.g., in cases where a user is
a direct or indirect member of groups with access to the object. Using negative rights,
the user can be explicitly denied access to the object while the user’s group membership
information is being updated and propagated, a process that may sometimes take significant
time in a large distributed system. AFS also retains the standard UNIX mode bits on files;
however, these are not used to enforce access on the server and only have local significance
on the user’s workstation.
Revocation in AFS is conceptually simple. Because user accounts are centrally man-
aged, any account can easily be disabled. Any user’s access to a directory can be revoked
by editing the corresponding ACL. In addition, negative rights allow for rapid revocation
if resolving and updating the user’s group membership is expected to take significant time.
3.4 xFS
xFS [Anderson et al. 1995], a serverless network file system, was developed as part of the
NOW project at UC Berkeley. Any node in the system can act as both server and client to
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provide all file system services in a peer-to-peer fashion. The primary concerns of the XFS
architects were better performance, scalability, and higher availability than traditional file
systems. However, the decentralized architecture of xFS does not carry over to its access
control mechanisms.
The xFS architects describe the system as appropriate for a restricted environment,
where machines trust one another’s kernels to enforce security, i.e. the system was de-
signed to operate within a given admnistrative domain. xFS nodes are split in two cate-
gories: trusted core nodes within the admnistrative domain and less trusted client nodes.
Trusted nodes run the standard xFS file sharing protocol and act as NFS servers to the
less trusted client nodes. Because communication with clients outside of the trusted adm-
nistrative domain follows NFS security semantics, xFS is functionally equivalent to NFS
for file sharing across organizational boundaries and consequently suffers from the same
limitations.
3.5 CIFS
The Common Internet File System (CIFS) [Leach and Perry 1996; SNIA CIFS Technical
Work Group 2002; Hertel 2003] is the network file system native to the Microsoft Windows
family of operating systems5. CIFS is based on the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol
[Microsoft Corporation 1996] originally developed at IBM in the mid-1980s [IBM Corp.
1984]. In CIFS every server offers a set of resources (directory tree, named pipe, printer)
to clients over the network. Whenever a resource is made available (shared) via SMB it is
given a share name. Before a client can access a share they must authenticate to the server
holding the corresponding resource.
CIFS permits a number of different authentication methods. The SMB protocol defines
two security levels: share-level and user-level.
Share-level mode is a form of SMB authentication from the days of early corporate
LANs when security was not considered a top priority and PC operating systems (e.g.
DOS) did not support user-based authentication. Thus, passwords, if used at all, are as-
signed to shares, not users, and are transmitted in plaintext over the network. Clients that
know the name of a server and a share, along with the potential password, can gain access
to that share. A single share may have multiple passwords assigned, each granting different
access rights, e.g. one password may grant read-only and another read/write access.
Share-level mode, while still used, is considered deprecated and has been replaced with
user-level mode. A server employing user-level security makes use of username/password
pairs instead of sharename/password pairs. With user-level security, a client must first
authenticate and get a valid UID, and then present the UID to gain access to any shares.
User-level security can be implemented using a plethora of authentication protocols. It is
possible to use anonymous or guest login, plaintext passwords, several challenge-response
variations (LM, NTLM, NTLMv2), and, in more recent versions, Microsoft’s implemen-
tation of Kerberos [Kohl and Neuman 1993; Linn 1996; Swift et al. 2002] or other mecha-
nisms based on the GSS-API [Linn 1997] and SPNEGO [Baize and Pinkas 1998].
Authorization in CIFS depends on the authentication level and the underlying file system
access control mechanism. In share-level mode authorization is combined with authentica-
tion: knowledge of a password grants access to a share. In user-level mode the server could
in the best case use ACLs to control file accesses. However, ACLs may not be available on
f
There are open source implementations for other platforms, e.g. Samba [sam ]
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all systems. Because CIFS was designed to work with DOS, OS/2, and Windows systems,
the underlying file system on the server could be FAT, FAT32, HPFS or NTFS. While FAT
has no concept of file ownership and only supports 6 attribute bits (e.g. the archive, hidden,
read-only, and system bits), NTFS offers support for ACLs. Thus, authorization in CIFS
can vary from none (when anonymous access is allowed) to access control by ACLs.
Object access granularity in CIFS is at the share level. In a file system context a share is
a directory.
Like NFS, CIFS was designed for tightly administered domains and thus does not sup-
port all the requirements for autonomous delegation across organizational boundaries.
Anonymous and guest access or share-level passwords do not provide accountability or
fine granularity of delegation. If user-level security with stronger authentication is used,
delegation of access control cannot take place without administrative intervention. Ad-
ministrators must either create accounts for users outside of the local domain, or deal with
establishing complex trust relationships between different domains.
Revocation in CIFS can be accomplished in a number of ways. Sharing of a resource
can be turned off. Administrators can disable user accounts. If supported, ACLs on any
files may be edited to revoke access at a finer level of granularity.
3.6 Truffles
Truffles [Reiher et al. 1993] is one of the early systems to recognize and address the need
for file sharing between users in different administrative domains. Truffles builds on the
replication services provided by the Ficus file system [Guy et al. 1990] and adds a mecha-
nism for setting up secure file sharing without administrator intervention. Sharing is at the
granularity of a volume, i.e., a subset of a local file system.
Truffles uses Privacy Enhanced Mail (TIS/PEM) [Linn 1993b; Kent 1993; Balenson
1993; Kaliski 1993] to authenticate users and provide a secure transport channel. Users are
identified by public keys bound to X.500 distinguished names in X.509 certificates [CCITT
1989]. Truffles authentication thus relies on a hierarchy of certification authorities. This
limits autonomous delegation, because users from different administrative domains still
need to have a common root CA.
Authorization in Truffles relies on standard UNIX and Ficus access control mechanisms,
where each file has a standard UNIX ACL associated with it. The authors propose that
a Truffles file system layer stacked on top of the Ficus logical layer perform mapping
between local UIDs and globally unique X.500 distinguished names.
Truffles does not address revocation. The authors plan to provide a method of destroying
volumes as a way to end a sharing relationship. However, revocation at a finer granularity,
e.g., denying a particular user access, is left as future work.
3.7 Bayou
Bayou [Terry et al. 1995; Petersen et al. 1996] is a replicated, weakly consistent storage
system designed for the mobile computing environment. Authentication in Bayou is based
on public-key cryptography. Every user possesses a public/private key pair and is authen-
ticated by the server using a challenge/response protocol.
Authorization in Bayou is based on digitally signed access control certificates. There
are three types of certificates:
—access granting certificates grant a user access (one of read, write, or server) to a data
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Identity:K 0
To:K 1
Attributes:A 1
Sign:S 1={K1,A1}K0-1
To:K 2
Attributes:A 2
Sign:S 2={K2,A2}K1-1
To:K 3
Attributes:A 3
Sign:S 3={K3,A3}K2-1
…..
Transfer1
Transfer2
Transfer3
Fig. 9. Structure of a CRISIS transfer certificate (from [Vahdat 1998]). The transfer certificate is a chain of X.509
certificates. The first certificate is an identity certificate identifying the principal wishing to make the transfer by
his public key, g@h . In each subsequent certificate the issuer transfers a subset of his available privileges to another
principal. E.g. in the first transfer g@h delegates privileges described by i _ to g _ and signs the certificate with
his private key, g
_
h
. Certificates can be arbitrarily chained, e.g. in this example g _ transfers privileges to g ` ,
who in turn transfers privileges to g a .
collection. Access granting certificates are signed by a single trusted signing authority.
—delegation certificates delegate a user’s privileges from an access control certificate to
another user. Delegation certificates must be signed by the delegating user.
—revocation certificates allow the original signer of a certificate to revoke it.
As a side note, Bayou requires separate certificates for read and write access.
All certificates in Bayou are signed by a single trusted signing authority. This limits
autonomous delegation across organizational boundaries, because a user in a different ad-
ministrative domain might be unknown to the signing authority. However, the authors sug-
gest that moving to a web of signing authorities should not be difficult. The access control
model in Bayou provides authorization at the granularity of a whole data collection.
Revocation in Bayou is accomplished using revocation certificates. Revocation certifi-
cates are stored by write operations and propagated with the data collections to which they
apply. Thus, revocations of write privileges are applied at the primary server, and there is
no need to ensure that every other server is notified of the revocation.
3.8 WebFS
WebFS is part of the WebOS [Vahdat 1998] project at UC Berkeley. WebFS is a global file
system layered on top of the HTTP protocol. This approach allows access to files through
the file system using existing URLs as file names. The security architecture for WebOS is
called CRISIS [Belani et al. 1998]. Authentication in CRISIS is based on X.509 certificates
[CCITT 1989; Polk et al. 2002; Housley et al. 2002].
Authorization in CRISIS uses a hybrid model to best exploit the tradeoffs between ACLs
and capabilities. Principals that should have long-term access to an object are listed on
the ACL for that object. In the case of WebFS, each file has an associated list of users
authorized to read, write or execute. The principals listed on an ACL can then further
delegate a subset of their rights to an object by creating transfer certificates, short-lived
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and revocable capabilities. Transfer certificates are encoded in X.509 format, digitally
signed and can be chained. Figure 9 shows the structure of a CRISIS transfer certificate.
Object access granularity inWebFS is at the file level. Autonomous delegation inWebFS
is limited since users can only delegate to users who have a certificate from a CA trusted by
the local domain. Because WebFS relies on a hierarchy of certification authorities, users
in different administrative domains still must have a common root CA to share files.
CRISIS has good support for revocation. If a principal is listed on an object’s ACL his
access can be revoked simply by modifying the ACL. When access is granted with certifi-
cates, revocation relies on timeouts. Each certificate is first signed by the principal making
a statement with a longer timeout. The certificate is then counter-signed by a principal of
the signer’s choosing. The counter-signature is issued with a shorter timeout. The counter-
signer acts as a locally trusted on-line agent (OLA). The OLA checks if a certificate has
been revoked before refreshing its counter-signature with a new short timeout. While the
CRISIS approach allows for shorter timeouts, it also introduces the need for trusted on-line
agents.
3.9 CapaFS
CapaFS [Regan and Jensen 2001] uses self-certifying file names as sparse capabilities to
control access to files by users in different administrative domains. A capability file name
consists of two parts: a client part used by the client to locate the remote server and a
server part used by the server to find the file in local storage. The client part contains the
hostname and port of the server. The server part contains the local path name and access
rights on the server and is encrypted to protect it from tampering. However, the resulting
capability file names are long and meaningless to users and necessitate the use of symbolic
links to assign meaningful names to remote files.
There is no explicit user authentication in CapaFS: knowledge of the filename (i.e., pos-
session of the capability) is sufficient to obtain access to a file. Authorization is based
on the access rights encoded in the server part of the capability file name. Object access
granularity is at the file level.
Because there is no local user identification in CapaFS, autonomous delegation is easily
achieved. To share a file, a user need only communicate the file name to another user.
Thus, no system administrator involvement is required. However, there are a number of
problems with the original CapaFS. Because knowledge of the file name provides access
to the file, communicating file names to other users must be done over a secure and au-
thenticated channel (however, no infrastructure for that is developed as part of the system).
The original CapaFS is also vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack because there is no
server authentication. The author describes how to implement server authentication by
adding the server’s public key to the capability filename. Because no client authentica-
tion is performed, there is no accountability in the original CapaFS, i.e., there is no way
of telling which particular user accessed a file. The author describes a way of adding
client authentication by adding a client’s public key to the server part of the capability file
names. The proposed approach allows for delegation to specific users by including their
public keys as an extension of the capability file name. However, there is no way for a
user to delegate only a subset of his access rights to another user, e.g.. a user possessing a
read/write capability file name cannot delegate read-only access to another user.
Revocation in CapaFS could be achieved by having the server keep a capability revo-
cation list (CRL) of all capability file names that have been revoked. This approach is
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/sfs/
Location
j k/l m
sfs.lcs.mit.edu :
HostID (specifies public key)
j k/l m
vefvsv5wd4hz9isc3rb2x648ish742hy /
path on remote server
j k/l m
pub/links/repository/sfscvs
Fig. 10. SFS self-certifying pathname (from [Mazieres et al. 1999])
unlikely to scale well as the list grows with time. Another approach suggested by the
author is to limit the lifetime of a capability file name by including a timeout in it.
3.10 SFS
SFS [Mazieres et al. 1999; Mazieres 2000; Fu et al. 2002] is a global decentralized file sys-
tem. SFS introduces the notion of self-certifying pathnames – file names that effectively
contain the appropriate remote server’s public key (see Figure 10). Thus, SFS needs no
separate key management machinery to communicate securely with file servers. By con-
vention, SFS files can be accessed under /sfs/Location/HostID/Path, where Location is
the DNS name or IP address of the server, HostID specifies the server’s public key, and
Path is the path to the file on the server. As with CapaFS file names, the strings become
difficult to remember due to the embedded cryptographic information, so symbolic links
must be used as a mnemonic aid.
SFS separates user authentication from the file system. Users in SFS are authenticated
using public key cryptography. An agent on the client side authenticates the user to a
separate authentication server on the remote server. The authentication server maintains a
database mapping public keys to UNIX credentials (a user ID and a list of group IDs). If a
user does not have an account on a file server, the server defaults to anonymous access.
Object access granularity in SFS is at the file level. Object access control in SFS is
similar to NFS. Authorization is performed by matching the UNIX credentials returned by
the authentication server with standard UNIX ACLs associated with each file.
Autonomous delegation in SFS is not supported because users must have an account on
the authentication server trusted by the file server. This would not necessarily be the case
for users in different administrative domains.
Revocation of a user’s access in SFS is simple and similar to what can be done in NFS.
Because the authentication server hosts a centralized user database, the user’s entry in the
database can be easily removed/disabled. A user can also be removed from groups that
appear on ACLs for files he is no longer supposed to access. The authors also describe
mechanisms for revoking self-certifying pathnames using revocation certificates, should a
server’s private key be compromised. As an alternative, a user’s agent can also request
HostID blocking from the client. The second approach could be useful when no signed
revocation certificate is found, but access restriction is still desirable, e.g., due to system
policy.
3.11 GSFS
GSFS [Kaminsky et al. 2003] is a further development of SFS with the goal of allowing
file sharing between users in different administrative domains. To achieve this goal GSFS
introduces changes to the SFS authentication server and extends the standard UNIX file
system with SFS ACLs.
Authentication in GSFS is based on public keys, similar to SFS. However, to facilitate
global file sharing, the authentication server is modified to contact servers in other admin-
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Fig. 11. Overview of the GSFS authentication architecture (from [Kaminsky et al. 2003])
istrative domains and retrieve remote user6 and group definitions (see Figure 11). Remote
authentication servers are referenced with self-certifying hostnames, similar to file servers.
A GSFS authentication server must contact the remote authentication servers of any remote
users or groups listed as members of local groups. Because of network latency and failures,
it is not feasible to do this at the time an authentication request is made. Thus, the GSFS
designers trade off freshness for availability by having the authentication server periodi-
cally (e.g., every hour) contact the remote authentication servers of any remote users or
groups listed in local group definitions. This introduces a delay between when a decision
to grant access has been made and when the actual access can occur.
Authorization in GSFS is done using ACLs. The ACLs are similar to those used in AFS,
but are extended to differentiate between files and directories. Access rights available in
GSFS ACLs include the right to modify the ACL itself. GSFS ACLs can list four different
kinds of principals:
—User Names allow a way of listing users with UNIX accounts on the local machine.
They are matched against the User Name field of UNIX credentials returned by the
authentication server.
—Group Names refer to groups defined on the local authentication server. Remote groups
cannot be listed directly on the ACL, but can be included indirectly by making them a
member of a local group. Group Names are matched against the groups returned by the
authentication server in the Group List credentials.
—Public Key Hashes are matched against the Public Key credentials returned by the
authentication server. Public key hashes are the only way of listing a remote principal
directly on a GSFS ACL.
—Anonymous entries simply match all users regardless of credentials.
As with SFS, object access granularity in GSFS is at the file level.
There are two scenarios for autonomous delegation in GSFS. In the first scenario, user
Alice may choose to share a file with user Bob in a different administrative domain by
listing a hash of Bob’s public key on the ACL of the file (assuming that Alice has the right
n
For the purposes of this discussion we define remote users to be users outside of the local administrative domain.
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to modify the ACL of the file). However, if Bob wants to then further share access to the
file with another user, Bob must also be given the right to modify the ACL of the file.
As delegation chains grow longer, this approach will lead to longer and harder to manage
ACLs on the fileserver. It is also impossible to allow fine-grained multi-level delegation,
e.g., if Alice gives Bob read access to the file and wishes him to be able to delegate that
access, she has to also give him the right to modify the ACL. However, in this case there is
nothing to prevent Bob from modifying the ACL and granting himself write access. Thus,
this approach is only suitable for limited one-hop delegation from a local user to a remote
user.
In the second scenario, Alice can create a local group (e.g., alice.friends) and list remote
users (e.g.,Bob) or groups from another administrative domain (e.g., friends@otherdomain)
as members of the local group7. Remote groups can in turn contain other groups and the
nesting can be arbitrarily deep. Thus, indirection through authentication servers can pro-
vide delegation. In contrast to public key hashes, multi-level delegation can be achieved,
e.g., if Alice allows access to a group owned by Bob, then Bob can add new members
(which can be other groups) to the group. However, this approach still makes it difficult
for a principal to delegate only a subset of his access rights. For example, if Alice has
allowed members of the group managed by Bob read/write access, Bob cannot delegate
read-only access to Carl.
Listing a public key hash directly has several advantages over using group or user names:
—Latency – because the user record does not have to be pulled from a remote authentica-
tion server, the user can begin accessing files immediately.
—Simplicity – users in a different administrative domain need not be associated with an
authentication server.
—Privacy – public-key hashes offer a degree of privacy by obfuscating the usernames on
a group membership list. Because anyone can query an authentication server and user-
names could correspond to e-mail addresses, group membership lists could be harvested
for purposes of sending unsolicited bulk electronic mail (“SPAM”).
Group and usernames on the other hand offer the following advantages over public key
hashes:
—Indirection allows for multi-level delegation. The remote authentication servers also
provide a single point of update if a user needs to change his key or revoke it.
—Naming – names are easier for users to keep track of than hashes and thus would im-
prove accountability and scalability.
Beyond the mechanisms for revocation available for SFS, GSFS must deal with revo-
cation involving remote users and groups. Thus, revocation in GSFS is closely related to
freshness. If a remote user changes his key or is removed from a remote group record, it
will take an update cycle for the change to be reflected on the local authentication server.
On the other hand, access granted to public-key hashes in GSFS can be instantly revoked
by editing the ACL or group record.
o
This assumes that there is a remote authentication server for the domain that Bob or Alice’s other friends belong
to.
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KeyNote-Version: 2
authorizer: "<Administrator’s Public Key>"
licensees: "<Alice’s Public Key>"
conditions: (app_domain == "DisCFS") &&
(HANDLE == "discfs://discfs.cis.upenn.edu/Makefile.stefgjxg")
-> "RWX";
signature:
"<Signature by Administrator>"
Fig. 12. Credential granting user Alice (as identified by her public key, in the Licensees field) access to file
Makefile.stefgjxg on host discfs.cis.upenn.edu. The 1024-bit keys and signatures in hex encoding have been
omitted in the interest of readability.
3.12 DisCFS
The Distributed Credential File System (DisCFS) [Miltchev et al. 2003] uses trust man-
agement credentials to identify: (1) files being stored; (2) users; and (3) conditions under
which their file access is allowed. Trust management [Blaze et al. 1996; Blaze et al. 1999a]
eliminates the need for ACLs by incorporating access control in a new kind of certificate,
namely an authorization certificate or credential. Such a credential directly authorizes an
action rather than dividing the authorization task into authentication and access control.
Unlike traditional credentials, which bind keys to principals, trust-management credentials
bind keys to the authorization to perform certain tasks. DisCFS uses KeyNote [Blaze et al.
1999b] as its trust-management engine. An example credential is shown in Figure 12.
Users in DisCFS are identified by their corresponding public keys. In contrast to tradi-
tional capabilities, trust-management credentials contain the identities (i.e., public keys) of
the user authorizing an action and the user authorized to perform the action (respectively
the authorizer and licensee in Figure 12). While there is no need for authentication in the
traditional sense of lookup in a user database, the server needs to verify that a user is the
legitimate owner of the public key it presents, i.e., that the user has knowledge of the cor-
responding private key. In DisCFS this is accomplished by the IKE [Harkins and Carrel
1998] key management daemon as part of the establishment of a secure IPsec [Kent and
Atkinson 1998] connection between the clients workstation and the file server. File sharing
then takes place over this IPsec association between the client and server hosts.
Authorization in DisCFS is based on trust-management credentials. When a user wishes
to access a remote file, the software on the client’s workstation sends the relevant cre-
dentials with a request to access the file on behalf of the user. The file server passes the
credentials along with a query to the KeyNote system. KeyNote checks the signatures on
all credentials, evaluates whether the conditions specified in the credentials are met and
returns an answer to the query. If the query is successful, the file server grants the user
access to the file8.
p
The question has been raised whether the DisCFS access control mechanism based on trust-management cre-
dentials could be implemented within the NFSv4 framework. Such a mechanism must implement the GSS-API.
SPKM could be used as the authentication mechanism because, both clients and servers are represented by public
keys. However, the GSS-API makes no provisions for authorization. Appendix A in [Linn 1993a] addresses pro-
posals to add support for Privilege Attribute Certificates (PACs) that carry authorization data. Trust-management
credentials seem functionally equivalent to PACs. The appendix states that PACs are currently not visible across
the GSS-API interface, and there are no plans to modify the interface, since there are concerns about it losing its
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DisCFS controls access at the file level, however trust-management credentials can also
be applied at a coarser granularity if system requirements favor a minimization of state
over fine-grained control.
DisCFS has full support for autonomous delegation between users in different admin-
istrative domains. If Alice has been granted access to a file, she possesses a credential
specifying her access rights (e.g., the one depicted in Figure 12). If she wishes to delegate
a subset of these access rights to Bob, Alice can create a new credential identifying her as
the authorizer, Bob as the licensee, and specifying Bob’s access rights in the conditions
field. Alice must then sign the new credential and send it to Bob along with her original
credential. When Bob requests access to the file, he must present the credential chain
consisting of both credentials. This mechanism provides autonomy and organizational in-
dependence: no administrator involvement is necessary, and Bob does not have to be a
member of the same administrative domain as Alice. Because each user acts as a CA in
DisCFS, the need for higher-level certification authorities is eliminated. Credentials are
signed to prevent tampering and can be sent in the clear or posted on the web9. DisCFS
provides good delegation latency: users can begin accessing files as soon as they are issued
a credential.
DisCFS supports multi-level delegation, i.e., if Alice delegates access to Bob, he can
then further delegate to Carl by creating a new credential. It is also possible to limit dele-
gation to one hop. Trust-management credentials allow for fine granularity of delegation:
users can delegate any subset of their rights. The trust management engine ensures that
there is no rights amplification, i.e., if Alice is granted read access to a file and issues Bob
a credential granting read/write access, Bob will not be able to write to the file.
Delegation in DisCFS preserves accountability, because the public keys corresponding
to each authorizer and licensee are included in the credentials.
Revocation in DisCFS is not as straightforward as in ACL-based systems, because it
is not always evident who has access to a resource10. Thus, DisCFS relies on timeouts
in credentials to limit their useful life. As a more user-centric system, DisCFS makes a
tradeoff and avoids the administrative overhead of running on-line agents for revocation
checks at the expense of having to use longer timeouts.
3.13 WebDAVA
WebDAVA [Levine et al. 2003] is a web file sharing service designed specifically for users
in distinct administrative domains. The system provides file transfer rather than file access
services, i.e. files must be transferred in their entirety between server and client, rather than
being manipulated in place. Thus, WebDAVA cannot be strictly classified as a network
file system, however we examine it as another example of a system using authorization
generality:
” Given that the GSS-API’s placement prevents it from providing a comprehensive solution to the
authorization issue, the value of a partial contribution specific to particular authorization models
is debatable.”
This suggests that a clean implementation of an access control mechanism based on trust-management credentials
within the GSS-API would not be possible.
q
Of course, this is not a good idea in environments where privacy of file access rights is desirable.
_
h In a multi-level delegation chain, a user is only aware of the next “hop”, e.g., if Alice delegates access to Bob,
and Bob delegates access to Carl, Alice has no knowledge of Carl, and thus no way to revoke his access.
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credentials to allow access across organizational boundaries.
Authentication in WebDAVA is performed using a challenge-response protocol. When
the server receives a file request it responds with a challenge containing a nonce and the
server’s public key. The client response includes the user’s public key, the file access
credential, and a newly created nonce credential signed with the user’s private key. While
the protocol details are somewhat vague, it seems like only the client is being authenticated.
It is possible that the server is authenticated by other means, e.g. using TLS [Dierks and
Allen 1999].
Authorization inWebDAVA is handled by KeyNote [Blaze et al. 1999b] trust-management
credentials. The credentials authorize desired actions corresponding to the HTTP GET or
PUT methods. Downloading a file from the server is done via the HTTP GET method. The
PUT method allows file creation or modifying a stored file by overwriting it. Deleting a
file is done by saving an empty file; the server notices that the file is empty and removes it.
Granularity of access control in WebDAVA is at the file level.
WebDAVA has full support for autonomous delegation between users in distinct ad-
ministrative domains. Users can delegate a subset of their access to any other users by
retrieving their public keys and issuing them a credential. No administrator involvement
is required. Credentials are protected from tampering by a signature and thus can be sent
over e-mail or downloaded from the web.
Revocation in WebDAVA is handled by credential expiration and certificate revocation
lists. Each file in the system has an associated file that stores hashes of revoked credentials
and thus acts as a CRL. Credentials are passed on to the KeyNote compliance checker for
evaluation only if their hash is not found in the revocation file. The original issuer of a
credential can revoke it by uploading it to the CRL using the PUT method.
3.14 Fileteller
FILETELLER [Ioannidis et al. 2002] is a credential-based network file storage system with
provisions for paying for file storage and getting paid when others access files. Users
get access to arbitrary amounts of storage anywhere in the network, and use a micropay-
ments system to pay for both the initial creation of the file and any subsequent accesses.
FILETELLER illustrates the use of trust-management credentials for both access control and
payment resulting in an elegant and scalable architecture that works across organizational
boundaries.
Authentication in FILETELLER is public key based. There are three participants in the
system: Network Users (NUs), Network Storage Providers (NSPs), and Check Guarantors
(CGs). All participants are identified by their public keys. An NU needs to authenticate
with the NSP before any file operation can take place. The authentication protocol must
provide strong authentication and, optionally, let the user piggy-back credential delivery to
the NSP. Security protocols like IPsec [Kent and Atkinson 1998] or TLS [Dierks and Allen
1999] can be configured to meet these requirements.
Authorization in FILETELLER is based onKeyNote [Blaze et al. 1999b] trust-management
credentials. An NU holds one or more credentials issued by a CG indicating the NU’s
credit line with the CG, as shown in Figure 13. There are four kinds of credentials used in
different parts of the system:
(1) Check Guarantor credentials, which specify a user’s line of credit.
(2) Microchecks, which authorize a payment from an NU to an NSP, or to another NU.
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Fig. 13. NSPs issue a KeyNote credential to each Check Guarantor (CG) authorizing them to act as introducers
of users, by in turn issuing them credentials. A file owner needs to convince a CG to provide them with a credit
line, also expressed as a KeyNote credential. The file owner needs to provide these two credentials to the NSP,
along with a microcheck conveying payment to the NSP. In response, the NSP returns to the file owner a KeyNote
access credential, granting her full privileges in accessing the file.
(3) Server credentials, issued by the CGs, that identify complying NSPs the NUs can use.
(4) File access credentials, initially issued by NSPs when a file is created, authorizing
subsequent access to that file by the NU owner. File owners can then issue further file
access credentials, delegating access to other NUs.
After authenticating, the NU needs to tell the NSP the name of the file to be accessed,
the operation type (create, replace, read, append, delete), the size of the file (for replace,
append, or create), the file disposition (ordinary or “pay-back”), the CG credential(s), a
transaction ID (a random number used to match requests with responses), and who the
owner of the file will be (if someone other than the creator). When the NSP receives
this description, it makes sure that the CG is one that it knows about, and sends back an
offer, consisting of the transaction ID, a nonce (for billing purposes), and the cost (in real
or “play” currency). The client then writes a microcheck11, and sends it along with the
credentials necessary to approve the operation: the CG credential(s), the file ownership
chain of credentials (if this is an access to an existing file), followed by a copy of the
offer, the operation, the file disposition, and the attributes. If the operation was a ‘create,’
‘replace,’ or ‘append,’ the contents of the file are sent. If the operation was a ‘read,’ or a
‘delete,’ nothing else is sent.
When a file is created, the server responds with a file access credential, granting the
creator of the file full access. If a file is replaced or appended to, the server responds with
a signed ‘receipt’ for the transaction. Otherwise, the file is sent to the client.
Granularity of access in FILETELLER is at the file level, i.e. users create, read, delete,
append to, or replace whole files. Whole files are prefered to individual blocks for two
reasons: to amortize the cost of a check verification over the transfer of an entire file, and
to avoid choosing some arbitrary block size and defining block-level operations, which
would tie FILETELLER to a particular file system philosophy rather than make it a general
file-storage service.
__
If the client request was for a file with a “pay-back” disposition, two microchecks must be issued; one to the
server, and one to the owner. The server verifies that the owner will get paid before releasing the file.
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Fig. 14. A user wishing to access another user’s file needs to have their own line of credit with a Check Guarantor
(CG), as well as a credential from the file owner granting them access to that file. When accessing the file, the user
needs to provide the credit-backing credential from the CG, a microcheck to the NSP, and the access credential(s)
to the file. If the owner has set a “pay-back” disposition for the file, an additional microcheck to the owner may
also be needed to gain access.
Autonomous delegation across organizational boundaries is supported in FILETELLER
as shown in Figure 14. An NU with access to a file can delegate a subset of his access
rights to another NU by issuing a file access credential. This delegation mechanism is
transitive and does not require administrator involvement. Users need not reside in the
same administrative domain, however a user wishing to access a file served by a given
NSP must establish a line of credit with a CG that recognizes the NSP as valid. Because
users are vouched for by a CG and uniquely identified by their public keys, accountability
is preserved. File attributes are used in file access credentials to allow fine granularity
delegation. These attributes are meta-data associated with the file by the owner, and can be
used to implement easy file grouping, associate security labels with files, or for any other
similar scheme.
Revocation in FILETELLER is time-based and relies on credential expiration. As with
[Blaze et al. 2001], CG credentials issued to users are relatively short-lived, avoiding the
need for credential revocation lists. Other revocation mechanisms could also be used with
FILETELLER, as specified on a per-credential basis.
4. ANALYSIS
Table I classifies the file systems studied within the framework defined in Section 2. Sys-
tems that were not designed for file sharing across organizational boundaries (NFS, AFS,
xFS, CIFS, SFS) require substantial administrator involvement for merging realms or ac-
count creation. The inability to list non-local users using ACLs in NFS, AFS, xFS, CIFS
and SFS makes it impossible for these systems to support autonomous delegation across
organizational boundaries.
The remaining systems reviewed in Section 3 exhibit varying degrees of support for
autonomous delegation. We present a more detailed comparison in Table II.
OBSERVATION 1. Systems that support autonomous delegation across organizational
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Table I. File system classification
Authentication Authorization Granularity Autonomous
Delegation
Revocation
NFS AUTH SYS,
Kerberos
ACL (UNIX) File system No ACL
NFSv4 Kerberos,
LIPKEY,
SPKM
ACL (NT) File No ACL
AFS Kerberos ACL (AFS) Directory No ACL
xFS AUTH SYS,
Kerberos
ACL (UNIX) File system No ACL
CIFS Plaintext
password,
Challenge-
Response,
Kerberos
ACL Directory No ACL
Truffles Public Key
(X.509)
ACL (UNIX) Volume Limited No
Bayou Public Key AC Certifi-
cate
Data Collection Limited Revocation certificate
WebFS Public Key
(X.509)
Hybrid File Limited ACL, CRL, OLA1,
Certificate Expiration
CapAFS No Capability File Limited CRL, Timeout
SFS Public Key ACL (UNIX) File No ACL, CRL
GSFS Public Key ACL (SFS) File Limited ACL, CRL
DisCFS Public Key Trust Mgmt.
Credential
File Yes Credential Expiration
WebDAVA Challenge-
Response
Trust Mgmt.
Credential
File Yes CRL, Credential Expi-
ration
Fileteller Public Key Trust Mgmt.
Credential
File Yes Credential Expiration
_
locally trusted on-line agent
boundaries use public-key cryptography for authentication.
It is hardly surprising that public-key cryptography is used as a building block for the
authentication mechanism employed by systems that need to scale beyond the local ad-
ministrative domain. Public-key cryptography eliminates the need for synchronous com-
munication with a trusted third party. The public keys of every host and user can be freely
distributed. Knowledge of the respective public keys allows two principals to establish a
secure communication channel without external administrative involvement. Out of the
systems supporting autonomous delegation, CapAFS is the only one that does not employ
public key cryptography (in the original design).
OBSERVATION 2. Mechanisms based on pure capabilities cannot provide accountabil-
ity.
Systems based on pure capabilities like CapaFS exhibit a high degree of user autonomy.
However, if the capabilities are not tied to user identities in any way, it is impossible to
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Table II. Autonomous delegation support in networked file systems
Autonomy Organizational
Independence
Low Latency Transitivity Fine
Granularity
Accountability
Truffles ± 1 ± ± ±
Bayou ± 2 ± ± ± ±
WebFS ± 3 ± ± ± ±
CapAFS4 ± ± ± ±
CapAFS5 ± ± ± ± ±
GSFS6 ± ± ± ± ±
GSFS7 ± 8 ± 9 ± ±
DisCFS ± ± ± ± ± ±
WebDAVA ± ± ± ± ± ±
Fileteller ± ± ± ± ± ±
_
Users from different administrative domains must have a common root CA.
`
All access granting certificates are signed by a single trusted signing authority.
a
Remote users must have a certificate from a CA trusted by the local domain.
e
Original design without user authentication.
f
With user authentication.
n
Public key hashes of remote users listed on ACL.
o
Remote groups listed on ACL.
p
Remote users must be associated with remote authentication server.
q
User records must be periodically fetched from remote authentication servers.
meet the accountability requirement for delegation. In addition, exchanging capabilities
becomes problematic, because their content should not be disclosed to third parties. The
CapaFS authors recognize the problems of using capabilities with no ties to user identities,
however the proposed solution does not meet the requirement for fine-grained delegation.
OBSERVATION 3. Mechanisms based solely on ACLs do not scale well to a user base
distributed across organizational boundaries.
GSFS, a further development of SFS, tries to address the problem of global file sharing us-
ing ACLs. However GSFS offers only limited support for delegation. If public-key hashes
are used to identify non-local users, the formulated requirement of multi-level delegation
is not met. If groups are used instead, multi-level delegation is possible, however the re-
quirement for fine-grained delegation is not met. This illustrates the difficulty of using an
ACL-based authorization mechanism when the users are distributed in different adminis-
trative domains.
OBSERVATION 4. Authorization certificates come closest to fulfilling all requirements
for autonomous delegation across organizational boundaries.
Bayou, WebFS, DisCFS, WebDAVA and Fileteller meet most of the requirements for au-
tonomous delegation. These systems rely on some form of authorization certificates: ac-
cess granting and delegation certificates, transfer certificates, or trust-management creden-
tials. Transitivity of delegation is achieved by chaining the certificates. Successive links
in a delegation chain can only refine, and never expand, the access rights of the original
certificate. This ensures that the fine granularity requirement for delegation is met. By
supporting both transitive and fine-grained delegation, the systems based on authorization
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certificates distinguish themselves from systems based on ACLs that tend to support either
transitive or fine-grained delegation, but not both.
OBSERVATION 5. There is a tradeoff between user autonomy and ease of revocation.
Systems based on ACLs (e.g., GSFS) do not provide full support for autonomous delega-
tion. However, access to an object can be revoked by simply editing that object’s ACL.
Some systems based on authorization certificates or ACL/authorization certificate hybrid
schemes (e.g., Bayou, WebFS) make provisions for delegation. These systems require
users in different administrative domains to have a common root CA. While this limits the
users’ organizational independence, it also makes revocation easier, since only a limited
number of CAs must be contacted to update CRLs.
In DisCFS and WebDAVA, a more user-centric approach is taken. Users act as CAs
and sign trust-management credentials they issue themselves. Thus, delegation in these
systems has the highest degree of user autonomy. However, because access control is com-
pletely decentralized, revocation must rely on certificate expiration or online revocation
authorities.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this article we provided a framework for comparing the suitability of access-control
mechanisms of networked file systems for global file sharing across organizational bound-
aries. We surveyed a number of systems in the context of our taxonomy. Systems based
on authorization certificates generally provide better support for autonomous delegation
of access rights between users in different administrative domains than systems based on
ACLs or pure capabilities. Future research on revocation of authorization certificates could
seek to minimize the existing tradeoff between user autonomy and ease of revocation. We
believe that our taxonomy provides a valuable contribution to the networked file systems
design space.
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